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A more banal
POLITICS?
Peter Beilharz responds that, while a more ordinary 
politics may be a good thing, it still needs to rise to the 
occasion.
R ichard Rorty is one of the most provocative and insightful of con­temporary philosophers—which is to 
say, of course, that by some criteria he 
is not a philosopher at all. He is a vital critic and 
public intellectual. In the age where grand narra­
tives collapse noisily like ageing dinosaurs in the 
jungle, Rorty pursues central social problems in 
a prose that is at once sprightly and clear. No mean 
feat. But do we need more banality in politics?
I find it difficult to disagree with Rorty's claim that we— 
western radicals—need a new political vocabulary. The 
question is, what might it be? Rorty correctly observes that 
the term socialism is completely discredited among citizens 
of the old Soviet Empire. They have a powerful claim to be 
heard, and to be taken seriously. But there are others, in the 
so-called third world and in the deindustrialising parts of 
the first world, who would still hitch their hopes to that star, 
or at least view socialism as a countertrend to the market, 
and they also have a right to be heard, whatever vocabulary 
they use.
Rorty's point here is that fellowtravelling has never been a 
small sin or a passing weakness on the part of leftists. For 
leftists, like everyone else, are suckers for success; and so 
the story that starts with the Red October, travels through 
China, eastern Europe and Cuba is an irresistible path of 
success for radicals who identify socialism's success with 
the achievement of state power.
Into the 1990s, it may be the case that socialism remains a 
defensible tradition or set of traditions, if only the obsession 
with state power is rejected. In Foucault's work, for ex­
ample— or even in that of the French anthropologist L£vi- 
Strauss, there is a sense that marxism is part of our culture; 
perhaps an oppositional moment, but nevertheless part of 
the furniture. Here I stand, I can say no other—Marx for me 
is usually half right, and therefore half wrong. Half full or 
empty, the critical philosophy is not yet ready for the 
junkyard. For marxism speaks a truth about the way the 
world works, about the extraordinary power of the 
economic, about the magical world of commodities. Sorel 
put a similar kind of case at the turn of the previous century, 
when he argued that socialism only made sense in tension 
with and against the everyday reality of capitalism—but it 
was the tension or struggle which mattered. An end to this
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tension would be an end to history, an absolute loss. The 
Sydney philosopher John Anderson argued a similar line 
in the 30s, with his proposition that labour actually needed 
capital because it needed a power to constitute itself 
against. The trouble began, imaginably, when the balance 
was overturned.
The ghost behind various of these cases is that of Hegel. To 
some, Hegel was a crazy system-builder, postmodernism's 
nightmare, part of the problem rather than the solution. But 
as always there are several Hegels or ways to read Hegel. 
The young Marx read Hegel as the theorist of the relation 
between master and slave. Hegel's image made it possible 
for Marx to think class struggle in a double sense— as 
containing a moment which reproduced power as well as 
one which suggested its overthrow. In short, the dialectic 
of master and slave suggested a theory which could ad­
dress both culture and power. Little accident then that this 
particular reading of Hegel became dominant in postwar 
French philosophy, for it made it hypothetically possible to 
address both how pernicious assymetrical relations of 
power could be, and how it was that the subordinate 
partner could help reproduce these relations.
To say this much is one way of confessing that I do not share 
Rorty's sense that we can or ought to junk marxism. Per­
haps his argument makes more sense in the context of 
American culture, where marxism had always been viewed 
as an alien, if not enemy growth and where there are live 
and rich alternatives such as pragmatism. Rorty proposes 
that we now have practically nothing in the way of a 
'theoretical basis' for political action, and that we may not 
in any case need one. This is a useful argument, because it 
puts theory back in its place, but it may also risk jeopard­
ising the idea that criticism is an important practice in itself. 
Rorty proceeds to argue—again I think correctly—that the 
20th century has been a mess partly because intellectuals 
have been too busy filling an invisible queue as would-be 
legislators or heroes. But the logic of his argument is that 
intellectuals should drop not only their bizarre pretensions 
to power, but even perhaps their claims to criticise or to 
influence.
The idea that we should, in our time, seek to make politics 
more ordinary therefore cuts both ways. In one sense 
politics is already so banal as to be anaesthetising. It's true 
that in Australia, for example, Dr Hewson has in mind 
something less than banal, something closer to scorched 
earth, and we can only hope that Australian electors in this 
context will go for the banal. But if we can go beyond that, 
what then of social democratic or liberal prospects? I agree 
with Rorty that there needs to be more talk of health and 
education. These were, indeed, original causes for socialists 
like Owen, Tawney, and the Fabians. Gas and water mat­
ters. But I cannot see how we can do this without talking 
also about ideologies and political visions, not least because 
Rorty is entirely correct to suggest that the whole process 
of reform is so incredibly fragile and contingent. The only 
lesson that history teaches today is that there are no lessons, 
at least as far as the teleological views of Right and Left are 
concerned. Here it is better to return, say, to Croce, with his 
sense that such progress as occurred was always contin­
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gent, for reaction lay always around the corner. Yet all these 
chops and changes rest on ideologies as well as actors.
The middle class is, as Rorty suggests, a major factor in all 
this, if only in the sense that recent charges in welfare policy 
regimes can be traced to changing preferences in middle 
class culture. What this serves to indicate, again, is the 
volatility of ordinary politics. This may well be a condition 
that we're stuck with; Labor in Australia will continually 
reintroduce the health care insurance programs which the 
Liberals will sell off again, and so on. Viewed from a certain 
cynical perspective, this kind of stop-go stuff may simply 
be a cosmetic means of keeping the economy going, just as 
crashing cars helps to keep up GNP indicators. This takes 
us not into banal politics so much as the banality of 
economics.
Richard Rorty's key cue here I take to be the idea that we 
should indeed entertain an ordinary politics, a politics after 
the heroic. None of us, arguably, are very good at doing 
ordinary politics, neither on a national nor transnational, 
regional or local basis. So this is also a positive exhortation, 
that we drop our eyes from the sublime, that we speak more 
of the prose of the world, that we avoid unnecessary 
abstraction in the way we think or speak. This inflection 
would indeed see radical language become more conver­
sational and democratic, and this would be a good thing. 
What makes me twitch is the possible suggestion that there 
could be a singular answer to the question: what then 
should intellectuals do? In the Australian setting there is 
always a risk that intellectuals construct the legitimacy of 
their work by marginalising that of others. 'Leftist' intellec­
tuals should, to my mind, be both reformists and radicals; 
some ought even be revolutionaries, surrealists, poets as 
well as policymakers. In this sense we probably still have 
something to learn even from the cultural and political 
milieu of October. If we are living after communism and 
after the heroic phase of socialism, then the question still 
remains how to create or revive an ordinary politics which 
can rise to the occasion.
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